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Gotcha! Coronavirus, Crises and the Politics of Blame Games 
 
Matthew Flinders, Founding Director of the Sir Bernard Crick Centre and Professor of Politics at the 
University of Sheffield. 
 
 
Amongst the contemporary chaos there are three predictions that can be made with relative certainty.  
The first is that around a year from now there is going to be a baby boom which will reflect what those 
couples that have enjoyed spending time together have been up to. The second is that the baby boom is 
likely to be matched by a similarly spectacular increase in divorces (reflecting those couples that did 
not enjoy spending so much time together). The final confident prediction is that in just a matter of 
weeks or months the Covid crisis will lead to an outbreak of divisive and disruptive political blame 
games as politicians, policy-makers, advisers and experts all seek to avoid carrying the can for those 
decisions or opinions that inevitably turned-out to be wrong. It is in the context of this core prediction 
that this sub-section makes three arguments: (i) the analysis of previous pandemics exposes the 
existence of a powerful socio-political negativity bias; (ii) politicians will try and manage this 
situation through a mixture of blame-games and self-preservation strategies; and (iii) it is already 
possible to identify a dominant strategy in the UK context that for the sake of brevity can be labelled 
hugging the experts.  
 
When it comes to considering the link between public trust and blame even the most cursory review of 
the existing scholarship on how governments have attempted to cope with pandemics in the past reveals 
a body of work that is primarily framed around the notion of policy failure. This is a critical point. No 
matter what steps a government might take or how quickly measures are put in place the fact that by its 
very existence a pandemic brings with it crisis and chaos intermixed with death and suffering ensures 
that any governmental response will be seen in generally critical terms. The title of Greg Behrmans 
2009 book The Invisible People: How the U.S. has Slept Through the Global AIDS Pandemic, the 
Greatest Humanitarian Catastrophe of Our Time reflects this point. Although it could actually be seen 
as fairly successful in terms of protecting life, the political reaction to the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) pandemic at the beginning of the millennium is generally critiqued in terms of either 
over-reaction or under-reaction (see, for example, Hooker and Harr Aliis, 2009; Freedman, 2005). Add 
to this the manner in which What went wrong? seems to be the dominant lens through which responses 
to both Swine Flu and Ebola are judged and the link between pandemic control and blame attribution 
becomes clear (see Kamradt-Scott, 2018). But whats also interesting about this seam of scholarship on 
pandemic crisis management is the manner in which it is infused with discourses not only of political 
blame and counter-blame, but also with discussions of self-blame, notions of shame and an awareness 
of the cultural apportionment of blame to specific countries or communities that is generally not 
discussed within the fields of public administration, executive studies or mainstream public policy (see, 
for example, Nerlich and Koteyko, 2012; Abeysinghe and White, 2011). A link is, however, provided 
in the work of Cáceres and Otte in their work on blame apportioning and the emergence of zoonoses 
(i.e. diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans) during the last twenty-five years when 
they note:  
 
[B]lame games take place between infected and non-infected regions, as well as between 
developed and developing nations. Apportioning of blame, more commonly known as finger 
pointing, is an inherent feature of human beings. This blaming process can be either active or 
passive depending on the issue(s) and given context(s). Evidently, blaming is used to shift 
responsibilities onto others, it singles out a culprit, finds a scapegoat and pinpoints a target, 
regrettably however, apportioning blame comes at a cost to those that are blamed. Expanding 
our epidemiological understandings into the realms of blamers and blamed permits a more 
realistic, emphatic and conscientious look into the unintended consequences of individual and 
institutional actions, and the extent to which other countries or regions are detrimentally 
affected by misguided pre-conceptions (2009, pp.377-8).  
 
This focus on the cost of blame and unintended consequences brings us to a second argument and 
the suggestion that politics of the coronavirus pandemic (in the UK and beyond) is already beginning 
to revolve around the issue of blame (blame-shifters, blame-shiftees, blame-boomerangs, etc.). In this 
regard, political science offers a rich seam of scholarship on blame avoidance behaviour that arguably 
dates back to at least Machiavelli but has more recently been developed in the work of scholars 
including R. Kent Weaver (1986) and Christopher Hood (2013). Synthesised and simplified down to 
its core elements, this body of work reveals how politicians are primarily motivated by avoiding blame 
for failure rather than trying to claim credit for success for the simple reason that the public possess a 
strong negativity bias. Praise will be as fickle as it is short-lived; whereas vitriol will be as strong as 
it will long-lived. The implication being that politicians will use all sorts of tricks and tactics  agenda-
shaping, scapegoating, buck-passing, defection and secrecy as part of a deeper Teflon immorality (see 
Smilansky, 2012) in order to keep themselves blame free. The relevance of this literature to the link 
between the coronavirus crisis and the broader crisis of democracy is the manner in which it connects 
the focus on public trust (discussed above) with the performative and substantive content of 
governmental policy responses.  
 
 
Table 2. Blame Game with Malign Outcomes and Sympathetic 
or Vindictive Public Attitudes 
 
Source. Hood. C. 2002. The Risk Game and the Blame Game, Government and Opposition, 




In this regard the work of Christopher Hood on the risk game and the blame game (see Table 2, above) 
is particularly valuable for at least three reasons: first, it highlights the range of blame-avoidance 
strategies that politicians can utilise (notably presentational strategies, policy positions and the 
delegation of responsibility arms-length agencies); second, it contextualises the use of these strategies 
through an emphasis on public attitudes; and thirdly it highlights that blame-shifting can backfire if 
those to whom responsibility is directed push back (hence the emphasis on blame-reversion, 
boomerangs and lightning-rods). The key question then becomes how this framework contributes to our 
understanding of the unfolding politics of coronavirus?  
 
Working across a very wide and fluid empirical landscape and using a fairly broad analytical brush, the 
main answer to this question can be summarised as follows. First and foremost, (and as the previous 
section emphasised) public attitudes to politicians, political processes and political institutions were in 
fairly poor health in most advanced liberal democracies as the pandemic emerged. High levels of 
political frustration, apathy and anger were identified within large sections of the public and this had 
led to the emergence of potentially democratically dangerous level of anti-political sentiment. In 
contextual terms and with Table 2 in mind, public attitudes were arguably leaning more towards the 
vindictive than the sympathetic vis-à-vis Hoods schema and this matters because the literature on 
pandemics and disease control clearly shows that whether the public is willing to follow public advice 
is highly dependent on pre-existing levels of political trust, hence its common focus on crying wolf, 
meta-communication patterns, epidemic intelligence and vaccine hesitation (see Nerlich and 
Koteyko, 2012; Mesch and Schwirian, 2015). The lack of pre-existing public trust may well have 
significant implications in terms of preventing what has been variously labelled crisis fatigue or 
lockdown fatigue (Flinders, 2020) amongst the public and a reluctance to abide by social isolation 
advice. The fact that in the UK these risks exist in the context of well-documented Brexit fatigue 
underlines the manner in which the coronavirus crisis cannot be studied in isolation and should more 
accurately be conceived as being layered-upon or inter-woven with a complex patchwork of challenges.  
 
A second way in which Hoods framework helps focus attention on the pandemic-democracy link, in 
general, and blame, in particular, is through the identification of specific blame-avoidance strategies. 
In the UK there has arguably been a very clear strategy at play which has revolved around the adoption 
of a technocratic, science-based and evidence-led approach that has ensured that no government 
statement has been made without the explicit caveat about following the advice of the experts. This 
hugging the experts is possibly even a future blame-avoidance tactic in preparation that represents an 
amalgam of presentational, policy and delegatory elements. The sight of Boris Johnson or other senior 
ministers flanked at the daily press conferences by the Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific 
Advisor is without doubt a strategic performative act of blame-sharing and blame-displacement. This 
is by no means unique to the UK.  In some countries a new public service bargain seems to have emerged 
whereby the politicians depart the stage to an almost total extent and let the experts become the public 
face of the crisis. Take, for example, Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases in the United States, Fernando Simón, the head of Health Emergency Centre in 
Spain, Christian Drosten, the head of virology at Charité hospital in Germany, Jérôme Salomon, head 
of the National Health Authority in France and Prof. Chris Whitty and Sir Patrick Vallance in the UK 
(the Chief Medical Adviser and Government Chief Scientific Adviser, respectively). As Jon Henley 
(2020) has illustrated, its the experts that are now the household names. Not only does this raise 
issues about the political selection of expert advice (discussed below) but it also raises questions about 
the political protections afforded to scientists who become drawn into major debates and may become 
blame-shiftees or sacrificial lambs when the scrutiny industry kicks-in.  
 
And kick-in it will. A third way in which the literature on blame games is relevant to the current 
coronavirus crisis is due to the manner in which it underlines the aggressive and adversarial nature of 
public accountability. This is encapsulated in the notion of the negativity bias and simply reflects that 
manner in which political decisions are generally taken in a low-trust, high-blame environment. Put 
slightly differently, public accountability is generally of the gotcha! variety (which is a particularly 
problematic paradigm when placed within the contours of Hilliard, Kovras and Loizides (2020) 
scholarship on the perils of accountability after crisis). The aim is very rarely to undertake a reasoned, 
balanced or proportionate review of what happened in order to learn lessons but primarily to apportion 
blame and demand some form of sacrificial responsibility. This is particularly true in power-hoarding 
majoritarian democracies like the UK and especially due to the focusing impact of the convention 
individual ministerial responsibility to parliament. Any attempt by ministers to deflect blame therefore 
risks bouncing-back on them in the form of a blame boomerang if the expert, scientist or publicly 
trusted professor refuses to be scapegoated. The fact that the dark clouds of intense public and 
parliamentary scrutiny are already visible and hanging over the coronavirus is symptomatic of the 
potentially pathological politics of accountability that this section is attempting to underline. The World 
Health Organisation declared the outbreak to be a pandemic on the 11 March 2020 and by the end of 
the second week of April 2020 fifteen parliamentary committees had already announced inquiries (some 







Table 3. In Crisis House of Commons Committees of Inquiry 
 
TOPIC COMMITTEE CLOSING DATE 
FOR EVIDENCE 
Coronavirus: Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Response 
Foreign Affairs Committee [Report published 
6 April 2020] 
Management of the Coronavirus 
outbreak 
Health and Social Care 
Committee 
n/a 
Quality of the Coronavirus Act and 
associated legislation and its 
effectiveness 
Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs* 
n/a 
Economic Impact of Coronavirus Treasury Committee 31/3/2020 
Impact of Covid-19 on the Charity sector Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee 
16/4/2020 
The Dept. for Work and Pensions 
response to the Coronavirus outbreak 
Work and Pensions Committee 16/4/2020 
Home Office preparedness for Covid-19 
(Coronavirus) 
Home Affairs Committee 21/4/2020 
The COVID-19 pandemic and 
international trade 
International Trade Committee 24/4/2020 
The impact of coronavirus on businesses 
and workers  
Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Committee 
30/4/2020 
Unequal impact: Coronavirus (Covid-19) 
and the impact on people with protected 
characteristics - 
Women & Equalities Committee 30/4/2020 
Covid-19 and food supply Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee  
1/5/2020 
Impact of Covid-19 on DCMS Sectors Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee 
1/5/2020 
Humanitarian Crises Monitoring: Impact 
of Coronavirus 
International Development  8/5/2020 
The impact of COVID-19 on education 
and childrens services 
Education Committee 31/5/2020 
The Governments response to COVID-
19: human rights implications 
Joint Human Rights Committee  22/7/2020 
UK Science, Research and Technology 
Capability and Influence in Global 
Disease Outbreaks 
Science and Technology 
Committee  
31/7/2020 
Notes:  1. List correct as of 15 April 2020. 
2. * PACAC has announced its intention to call ministers to account on the topic but 




The number or range of select committee inquiries  or, for that matter, any forms of public 
accountability process  is not the issue. The point being made relates to the nature and ambitions of 
those scrutiny processes and whether they themselves become part of the problem with democracy, due 
to a focus on scalp-hunting and shallow adversarialism that is devoid from any appreciation of the 
realities of crisis management, or part of the solution, in terms of promoting a balanced assessment of 
what went wrong, why and how similar patterns might be avoided in the future. In essence this is the 
argument relating to understanding that forms the focus of the next and final section but before engaging 
with this argument it is necessary to conclude this section with a very discussion of three final blame-
related insights.  
 
The first is that it is likely that the coronavirus crisis will serve to redefine the scholarship on blame-
shifting just as it is likely to alter the contours of the debate concerning democracy. The complexity and 
intricacies of crisis-responses will somehow have to be accommodated within models that have 
generally been constructed around and within the notion of national systems. And yet we can already 
see the emergence of global blame games wherein specific and primarily American politicians and 
organisations are attempting to blame China for the crisis (see Henderson et al., 2020); while China 
seeks to pass the buck back to the United States in what has become a war of words amidst Covid-19 
(see The Straits Times, 13 March 2020). Donald Trump is widely interpreted as trying to scapegoat the 
World Health Organisation by withdrawing American funding. European blame games are also 
beginning as, for example, Italy blames the European Union for being too slow to help member states 
(see Boffey, 2020). Within the UK cracks and pressure-points are already beginning to appear as 
tensions grow between departments, ministers, officials, agencies and advisers as the prospect of public 
scrutiny become ever more immediate. This brings us to a second issue and the blame attraction or 
buck stops here qualities (see Table 2, above) that come with being a minister. Despite the cross-
governmental nature of the challenge, in strict constitutional terms it is the Secretary of State for Health 
and the Prime Minister who are likely to emerge as the lightning rods when it comes to the allocation 
of blame and as key targets when it comes to demands for a sacrificial lamb to carry-the-can. And yet 
even here the curiosities of coronavirus may well defeat conventional understandings.  
 
 
On the one hand, the emergence of the Health Secretary from virus enforced self-isolation on the 2nd 
April to announce that mistakes had been made and that a U-turn on testing policy was needed that 
would see capacity increased to 100,000 tests a day by the end of April was a clear attempt to bolster 
public confidence by taking very clear personal responsibility for the target; on the other hand, the 
announcement that the Prime Minister had been taken to hospital and then moved into intensive care 
potentially insulates him from some element of blame, and may well fuel a second rallying around the 
flag effect for the government as the media and opposition parties soften their stance. Although there 
is evidence to support this claim it might be more accurate to identify the existence of a post-
hospitalisation surge in support for the Prime Minister rather than the government. Boris Johnson was 
discharged from hospital on the 12 April 2020 and a YouGov approval rating poll conducted at the time 
found a staggering leap in the proportion of the public who thought he was doing very well as Prime 
Minister (30%, up from 14% in mid-March), with 36% suggesting he was doing fairly well (up from 
32%). Boriss Teflon-coated qualities and blame-avoidance behaviour have been discussed throughout 
his political career and he has been known to adopt cunning exit strategies in the past when faced with 
tricky situations. Nevertheless, the notion of medical distancing as a blame avoidance strategy would 
be extreme even for this most unconventional politician and Boris appears to be more popular than ever, 
possibly to the despair of his opponents.    
 
 
That said, the core argument of this section remains true: the coronavirus crisis is likely to spark a 
veritable tsunami of complex and aggressive blame games. This creates a strong risk that the structures 
of democratic governance will themselves fall victim to the painful politico-administrative malady that 
is generally labelled going MAD (i.e. Koppells (2005) multiple accountabilities disorder). This 
occurs when politicians and their officials are expected to account through so many different 
accountability channels and to so many scrutiny bodies  which themselves often demand very different 
forms of information and are blame-orientated rather than understanding-focused  that they are 
distracted from focusing on their core tasks. Put slightly differently, MAD occurs when senior staff are 
expected to spend too much time accounting-up instead of focusing on delivering-down which, in 
turn, increases the chances that mistakes and errors will be made which would, in turn, simply increase 
the scrutiny placed upon them. The potential pathologies of highly politicized accountability, as 
Matthew Flinders (2011) has demonstrated, means that too much accountability can be as problematic 
as too little.  
 
